Based on author's dissertation--Yale University.

The distinction between discovery and justification is ambiguous. This obscures the debate over a logic of discovery. For the debate presupposes the distinction. Real discoveries are well established. What is well established is justified. The proper distinctions are three: initial thinking, plausibility, and acceptability. Logic is not essential to initial thinking. We do not need good supporting reasons to initially think of an hypothesis. Initial thoughts need be neither plausible nor acceptable. Logic is essential, as Hanson noted, to both plausibility (...) and acceptability. An hypothesis needs good supporting reasons to be either plausible or acceptable. Such reasons need not be relative to the particular scientific theory undergoing test at the time. There is no fundamental difference between reasons relevant to plausibility and acceptability. The difference is one of degree. Acceptability requires more than plausibility. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I consider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. Each of these writers would hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, (...) in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that "incommensurable" replacement is what does, and should, occur during scientific "revolutions." Such writers, however, have trouble in comparing different scientific theories. My account permits different theories to be compared in various ways. These comparisons, I argue, are possible through appeal to "first-level" and "second-level" invariance. In this connection I argue that observation, meaning, and regulative standards should be, and in fact usually are, nontrivially invariant with respect to scientific change. (shrink)

On Becoming an Effective Teacher presents the final unpublished writings of Rogers and as such has a unique historical value. It also documents the research results of four highly relevant, related but independent studies which comprise the biggest collection of data ever accumulated to test a person-centred theory in the field of education. This body of comprehensive research on effective teaching was accomplished over a twenty-year period in 42 States in the U.S. and in six other countries including the UK, (...) Germany, Brazil, Canada, Israel, and Mexico, and is highly relevant to the concerns of teachers, psychologists, students, and parents. The principal findings of the research in this book show that teachers and schools can significantly improve their effectiveness through programs focusing on facilitative interpersonal relationships. Teachers who either naturally have, or are trained to have empathy, genuineness (congruence), and who prize their students (positive regard) create an important level of trust in the classroom and exert significant positive effects on student outcomes including achievement scores, interpersonal functioning, self-concept, and attendance. The dialogues between Rogers and Lyon offer a unique and timeless perspective on teaching, counselling and learning. The work of Reinhard Tausch on person-centered teaching to counselors, parents, athletics, and even textbook materials, as well as research on the interactions of teachers and students, is among the most thorough and rigorous research ever accomplished on the significance and potential of a person-centered approach to teaching and learning. (shrink)

Feyerabend claims that what is perceived depends upon what is believed ; and he maintains that among really efficient alternative theories "each theory will possess its own experience, and there will be no overlap between these experiences". According to Feyerabend "scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences...". Toulmin, Hanson, and Kuhn concur with this view. Toulmin claims that men who accept different "ideals" and "paradigms" (...) will see different phenomena. He thinks theories not only give significance to facts, but also determine what facts are for us at all. Like Feyerabend, Toulmin asserts that "we see the world through" our fundamental concepts of science "to such an extent that we forget what it would look like without them". Indeed, both Feyerabend and Toulmin would have previous thinkers "live in an observational world very different from our own". Kuhn expresses quite similar views. He feels that. (shrink)

479 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 Sandra B. Rosenthal. Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Pp. xi + 177. Board, $16.95. Sandra Rosenthal's Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism represents a sustained discus- sion of those aspects of Peirce's philosophy that suggest that he was a philosophical pluralist. The book contains a complex, intricate, and extremely well documented exhibition of how the uniqueness of Peirce's thought places him beyond traditional views labeled as (...) phenomenalist, idealist, and realist. The kind of pluralism -- not nominalistic, but "pragmatic pluralism"--underlying Peirce's thought, however, is not a relativistic anti-foundationalism; it affirms nonarhitrary epistemological and metaphysical commitments. The first chapter examines Peirce's conceptions of world, truth, and science. The actual world is a system of facts that must be understood in terms of perceptual and.. (shrink)

The way we communicate with each other is vital to preserving the cultural ecology, or wellbeing, of a place and time. Do we listen to each other? Do we ask the right questions? Do we speak about each other with respect or disdain? The stories that we convey on screens, or what author Carl Plantinga calls 'screen stories,' are one powerful and pervasive means by which we communicate with each other. Screen Stories: Emotion and the Ethics of Engagement argues (...) that film and media studies needs to move toward an an approach to ethics that is more appropriate for mass consumer culture and the lives of its citizens. Primarily concerned with the relationship between media and viewers, this book considers ethical criticism and the emotional power of screen stories that makes such criticism necessary. The content we consume-- from television shows and movies to advertisements-- can significantly affect our welfare on a personal and societal level, and thus, this content is subject to praise and celebration, or questioning and even condemnation. The types of screen stories that circulate contribute to the cultural ecology of a time and place; through shared attention they influence what individuals think and feel. Plantinga develops a theory of the power of screen stories to affect both individuals and cultures, asserting that we can better respond ethically to such media if we understand the sources of its influence on us. (shrink)

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The first issue concerns what can be meant by the "newness" or "originality" which Koestler attributes to the products of creative acts. One of the purposes of this paper will be to discriminate several distinct but incompatible meanings which Koestler associates with the newness in created objects. The second issue concerns whether Koestler's thesis commits him to a form of determinism or indeterminism with respect to human creative activity. The third issue raises the question whether his thesis is intended as (...) an explanatory hypothesis or as an elaborate description of common features in creative activities. This question, of course, relates directly to the initial query about the standards of understanding which are appropriate to creative acts. And it points to the last issue which concerns the metaphysical implications of the thesis. It will be my aim to argue that a development of the metaphysics implicit in the thesis would provide a more comprehensive theory that could meet at least some of the difficulties the theory raises. (shrink)

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti–idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

There is a strong mystical strain running through the Neo-Platonic tradition. It arises from the claim that the One is absolutely transcendent, beyond all thought and all being, ineffable and incomprehensible. This claim readily appears in the doctrines of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Damascius. It is, however, most carefully dealt with and receives its most systematic espousal from the celebrated Proclus of Athens. Proclus’ Commentary On The Parmenides is a polished espousal of the first hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides. It is there (...) that he expresses his own view of the One and shows his acute sensitivity to logical problems arising from it. It will be my attempt here to examine the tenability of Proclus’ view of the One. In the course of this examination I will evaluate some of his solutions to the logical difficulties resulting from his position as to the One. I wish to argue that his position is beset with insurmountable difficulties and that his solutions to them are unsatisfactory. (shrink)